Wall Street, Gold surged on hopes of Powell and Trump ‘PUT’

·       Fed Chair Powell sounded less hawkish than earlier after US-China tariff war truce; Fed may cut rates 50 bps cumulatively in September-December’25

·       Deal maker Trump may soon withdraw his 20% Fentanyl punishment levy on China and extend the tariff war ceasefire at least till December’25 to ensure his vote and note bank

·       Trump has to ensure tariff policy uncertainty ahead of the holiday shopping season/X-Mas as eventually US consumers or corporations have to bear his tariffs

·       Even at 10% basic and 25% sectoral tariffs, the weighted average tariffs for US imported goods may be around 12.5%, still substantially higher than the 2.5% prior, but manageable

On Wednesday, May 14, 2025, Wall Street closed mixed as the Fed may not oblige for a rate cut in June-September 2025 amid tariff discussion-related uncertainty, especially with China. The S&P 500 added 0.1% after erasing its losses for the year, while the Dow-30 edged down 89 points and the Nasdaq 100 surged 0.7%, boosted by gains in major chipmakers. Nvidia surged following reports of AI chip shipments to Saudi Arabia, and AMD soared after unveiling a $6 billion share buyback plan. The broader AI rally fueled a 17% surge in Super Micro Computer, helping lift overall market sentiment.

Optimism was further supported by a temporary U.S.-China tariff reduction, raising hopes for a broader trade agreement despite ongoing uncertainties. Meanwhile, President Trump’s Middle East visit led to several new business deals, including a Boeing-Qatar Airways agreement and AI initiatives in the Gulf. Trump emphasized that almost $10T investment was committed in his first 100 days of 2nd term, a record amid his tariff threat. Although mega-cap stocks showed strength, sector performance was mixed, and Fed officials signaled a cautious outlook amid mixed inflation data.

Early Thursday, Wall Street Futures slipped amid lingering uncertainty over tariff negotiations and a report that UnitedHealth may face a probe over corruption allegations regarding Medicare. Gold slid on the US-China trade war pause, fading hopes of an all-out Trumpcession, the Trump administration's commitment to a strong dollar policy, and progress on the Ukraine war ceasefire.

On May 15, 2025, President Trump’s comments during his Middle East trip, specifically in Qatar and the UAE, focused on economic achievements, regional security, and his administration’s foreign policy priorities.

On Economic Deals in Qatar

Trump highlighted a major Qatar Airways purchase of 160 Boeing jets, calling it the “largest order in Boeing’s history” and a “tremendous win for American jobs.” He made these remarks during a signing ceremony in Doha with Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, emphasizing the strengthening of U.S.-Qatari economic ties.

On U.S.-Qatar Relations:

He described Qatar as a “great friend, a tremendous ally,” noting cooperation in defense and business. Trump’s comments underscored Qatar’s strategic importance, particularly as home to the Al Udeid Air Base, where he delivered remarks to U.S. troops on May 15.

On the Qatari Jet Offer

Trump defended Qatar’s offer to donate a $400 million Boeing 747 to replace Air Force One, calling it a “no-brainer” in a prior Fox News interview referenced during the trip. He dismissed ethical concerns, arguing the current Air Force One was “small” and less impressive than Middle Eastern leaders’ planes. He reiterated this stance in Doha, with House Speaker Mike Johnson supporting the gift as being to the U.S., not Trump personally.

On Israel and Middle East Diplomacy

Addressing speculation about bypassing Israel on the trip, Trump stated in Doha, “This is good for Israel, having a relationship like I have with these countries, Middle Eastern countries, essentially all of them. I think it’s very good for Israel.” This was in response to questions about tensions with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, given Israel’s absence from the itinerary.

On Iran and Nuclear Talks

In the UAE on May 15, Trump claimed the U.S. and Iran had “sort of” agreed to terms on a nuclear deal, though he provided no specifics.

On Syria Sanctions

While not directly quoted on May 15, Trump’s earlier statement on May 12 (before departing for the Middle East) was reiterated in coverage of his trip: “We may take them off of Syria because we want to give them a fresh start.” This reflected his announcement in Saudi Arabia to lift Syrian sanctions, a policy he continued to endorse during the trip.

On the Ukraine Ceasefire

Although no direct comments on the Russia-Ukraine war were reported on May 15, Trump’s broader Middle East trip context included his ongoing push for a ceasefire. On Truth Social that day, he endorsed Putin’s proposal for direct talks in Istanbul, stating, “Ukraine should agree to this, IMMEDIATELY. At least they will be able to determine whether or not a deal is possible, and if it is not, European leaders and the U.S. will know where everything stands, and can proceed accordingly!” This aligns with his earlier May 5 comment to NBC News, “Russia wants all of Ukraine — and if I hadn’t intervened, they’d be fighting for all of it now,” indicating his continued focus on brokering a deal.

Summary

Trump’s comments on May 15 were made during a high-profile Middle East tour, with stops in Qatar and the UAE following Saudi Arabia. His remarks emphasized economic wins, such as the Boeing deal, and reinforced his transactional approach to diplomacy, evident in his defense of the Qatari jet offer and praise for Gulf allies. The mention of an Iran nuclear deal was notable but lacked detail, reflecting his tendency to project optimism without concrete outcomes. His Syria sanctions stance and Ukraine ceasefire push, though not directly quoted on May 15, were part of the trip’s broader narrative, highlighting his preference for bold policy shifts.

On the India trade deal

During his Middle East trip, specifically in Doha, Qatar, on May 15, 2025, President Trump made significant comments regarding a potential trade deal with India, focusing on tariff reductions. These remarks were part of a broader discussion with business leaders, where he also announced deals with Qatar.

Claim of a Zero-Tariff Offer by Tariff King India

Speaking at a business forum in Doha, Trump stated, “It is very hard to sell in India, and they are offering us a deal where they are willing to charge us no tariffs.” He reiterated this claim to reporters, saying, “India has offered us a deal where they are willing to charge us no tariff,” suggesting a breakthrough in trade negotiations. Trump’s comments implied that India, which he has previously criticized as a “tariff abuser” with some of the world’s highest import tariffs, was ready to eliminate tariffs on U.S. goods, a significant shift from its protectionist policies.

Apple’s Investment in India

In the same meeting with executives, Trump expressed dissatisfaction with Apple’s plans to expand its manufacturing footprint in India, framing it as a counterpoint to the trade deal. He suggested that the proposed zero-tariff deal would make it easier for U.S. companies to export to India without needing to invest locally, aligning with his goal of boosting American exports.

No Specific Details Provided

Trump did not elaborate on the specifics of the deal, such as which goods would be covered, the timeline, or reciprocal U.S. concessions. His remarks were broad, focusing on the headline of “no tariffs” without addressing the complexities of the ongoing negotiations.

India’s Response: Trump’s ‘zero tariffs’ claim is disputed by the Indian Foreign Minister

India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar later countered Trump’s claim, stating, “Nothing is decided till everything is,” emphasizing that trade talks were ongoing and no final agreement had been reached. Jaishankar stressed that any trade deal must be “mutually beneficial” and work for both countries, adding, “Until that is done, any judgment on it would be premature.” This response highlighted India’s cautious approach and commitment to protecting its interests and also satisfying domestic political compulsion.

On May 9, 2025, India proposed slashing its tariff gap significantly, including a rare “forward most-favored-nation” clause to ensure the U.S. receives tariff terms as favorable as any other trading partner, a move to “future-proof” the deal. India’s Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal was scheduled to lead a trade delegation to the U.S. from May 16 to 20, 2025, to advance talks with U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Greer and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. India’s recent threat to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods, in response to U.S. duties on Indian steel and aluminum, was expected to be a key discussion point, signaling New Delhi’s assertiveness. On May 15, India's Trade Secretary said US trade discussions are progressing well and India is working with the US in the direction of a joint statement on trade.

Indian Market Reaction

Trump’s comments triggered a rally in Indian markets, with benchmark equity indices surging nearly 1.5% to a seven-month high on May 15, driven by optimism about improved U.S.-India trade ties, especially after the Pakistan war ceasefire episode.

Highlights of Trump’s comments on May 15:

·       We were losing the Middle East due to the past administration

·       Iran has agreed to terms; we want them to succeed

·       We're getting close to doing a deal with Iran

·       Think we are getting very close to getting a deal with Iran

·       We've raised trillions from this trip

·       At least $10 trillion in investment, potential investments

·       Markets Pay Attention When Federal Reserve Speaks

·       India offers a deal not to charge tariffs

·       informed Apple CEO we did not want him to build in India

·       India Offers to Drop All Tariffs on the US

·       India offered the US a deal, one with zero tariffs

·       Trump says he doesn't want Apple building products in India: 'I had a little problem with Tim Cook'

·       Rather pay the debt before doing the sovereign wealth fund

·       The US military will soon be bigger, better, stronger

·       Nothing is going to happen until Putin and I get together

US Treasury Secretary Bessent:

·       We now have a mechanism with our Chinese counterparts

·       We are going into a series of negotiations with China to prevent escalation again

Highlights of comments by Fed’s Chair Powell on May 15:

·       Officials agree that strategic language around both shortfalls of employment and average inflation needs to be reconsidered

·       April PCE likely around 2.2%

·       The framework needs to be robust to many circumstances, including a world where supply shocks may be more frequent

·       The Fed is undertaking a two-day review of revisions to its framework adopted in 2020

·       Zero-lower bound is still a risk and should be addressed in the framework, though it is no longer a base case given the current level of policy rates

·       Revisions to Fed communications are also being considered

·       The idea of a moderate overshoot of inflation following weakness became irrelevant given the levels of inflation reached

·       Certain aspects of the Fed's approach are permanent, such as the focus on inflation expectations

·       We may be entering a period of more frequent supply shocks

·       Fed's Powell cautions about higher long-term rates as 'supply shocks' provide policy challenges

Highlights of comments by Fed’s Daly on May 15:

·       Monetary policy positioned well, moderately restrictive

·       Monetary policy well well-positioned to respond

·       Strong growth, robust labor market, decreasing inflation

·       Economic expansion and the job market are strong, and inflation is decreasing

·       Federal Reserve policy can adjust to any economic developments

·       Patience is the word for today

·       Solid Loan Demand, Credits Are Good

·       Business is cautious amidst the economic uncertainty, but not "stalling out"

·       Shock to sentiment not reflected in broad pullback in consumer and business spending

·       Uncertainty Depresses Activity

·       Uncertainty could impact the economy

·       Uncertainty shock not yet causing a demand shock

·       Can't give forward guidance now due to the uncertainty

Fed's Jefferson:

·       The current moderately restrictive policy rate is a good place to respond to economic developments.

·       Watching closely for signs in hard data of weaker activity

·       Recent inflation data is consistent with further progress toward the 2% goal, but the future path is uncertain due to tariffs

·       I expect lower growth due to trade policy, but I expect the economy to still expand over the year

·       Tariffs could lead to higher inflation, still uncertain if the impact would be temporary or persistent

·       The labor market is still solid

·       Whether tariffs create persistent inflation depends on the implementation, the response of supply chains, and other factors.

·       The First-quarter GDP data overstated the deceleration in activity

·       Current policy is a good place to respond to economic developments

Relevant Text of Fed Chair Powell’s comments at the Second Thomas Laubach Research Conference on May 15 about Fed policy review:

“As in our last review, the 2025 review consists of three key elements: this conference, Fed Listens events at Reserve Banks around the country, and policymaker discussions and deliberations, supported by staff analysis, at a series of FOMC meetings. In the current review, we will reconsider aspects of our strategic framework in light of the experience of the last five years. We will also consider possible enhancements to the Committee's policy communication tools, regarding forecasts, uncertainty, and risks.

The Consensus Statement

In 2012, the FOMC first codified our monetary policy framework in a document entitled the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, which we refer to as the consensus statement. The language in the opening paragraph, which has never changed, articulates our commitment to fulfilling our congressional mandate and to explaining clearly what we are doing and why. That clarity reduces uncertainty, improves the effectiveness of our policy, and enhances transparency and accountability.

As Chair, Ben Bernanke led the Committee through the creation of that initial consensus statement, adopting a 2 percent inflation target, and outlining our approach to achieving our congressionally assigned dual mandate. The framework laid out in that document broadly aligned with best practices for a flexible inflation-targeting central bank.

The structure of the economy evolves, and monetary policymakers' strategies, tools, and communications need to evolve with it. The challenges presented by the Great Depression differ from those of the Great Inflation and the Great Moderation, which in turn differ from the ones we face today. A framework should be robust to a broad range of conditions but also needs to be updated periodically as the economy and our understanding of it evolve.

2019–20 Review

From 2012 to 2018, the FOMC voted at each January meeting to reaffirm the consensus statement, in most years without substantive changes. In 2019, we changed that practice, conducting our first-ever public review, and said that we would repeat such reviews at roughly five-year intervals. There is nothing magic about a five-year pace. We believe that frequency is appropriate to reassess structural features of the economy and to engage with the public, practitioners, and academics on the performance of our framework. Several of our global peers have adopted similar approaches to their framework reviews.

At the time of the last review, we had been living for about a decade in a new normal characterized by proximity to the effective lower bound, with low interest rates, low growth, low inflation, and a very flat Phillips curve. If I could capture that era with one statistic, it would be that the policy rate had been stuck at the lower bound for seven long years following the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in late 2008. After liftoff in December 2015, we were able to raise the policy rate only very gradually over three years to a peak of just 2.4 percent. Seven months later, we began reducing it, leaving the rate at 1.6 percent in late 2019, where it would be when the pandemic arrived a few months later. Policy rates in other major advanced economies were even lower, in many cases below zero, and in all such economies, inflation regularly ran below its target.

The sense at that time was that when the economy next experienced even a mild downturn, we would be right back at the lower bound, probably for another extended period. The post–financial crisis decade had demonstrated the pain that could bring. Inflation would likely decline in a weak economy, raising real interest rates as nominal rates are pinned at zero. Higher real rates would further weigh on job growth and reinforce the downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations.

Reflecting these concerns, we adopted a policy to make up for persistent shortfalls from the inflation target, an approach that was common in the extensive literature on the risks associated with the lower bound. Given the downside risks to employment and inflation from proximity to the lower bound and the need to anchor longer-term inflation expectations at 2 percent, we said that following periods in which inflation has been running persistently below 2 percent, we would likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2 percent for some time.

We also concluded that policy decisions would be informed by assessments of "shortfalls" rather than "deviations" from maximum employment. The change to shortfalls was not a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness. Rather, it signaled that apparent labor market tightness would not, in isolation, be enough to trigger a policy response, unless the Committee believed that, if left unchecked, it would lead to unwelcome inflationary pressure.

This change reflected our experience with long expansions that featured historically low unemployment amid low and stable inflation, suggesting that a policy approach that carefully probed for the maximum level of employment could bring about the benefits of a strong labor market without risking price stability. In the years just before the pandemic, for example, unemployment was at multi-decade lows while inflation ran below 2 percent. By December 2019, estimates of the longer-run unemployment rate had fallen sharply. The use of "shortfalls" acknowledged that a combination of low inflation and low unemployment does not necessarily pose an adverse tradeoff for monetary policy.

The economic conditions that brought us close to the lower bound and drove the changes in our consensus statement were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that were likely to persist for an extended period, at least until our next five-year review. And that might well have been the case had the pandemic not intervened.

The idea of an intentional, moderate overshoot proved irrelevant to our policy discussions and has remained so through today. There was nothing intentional or moderate about the inflation that arrived a few months after we announced our changes to the consensus statement. I acknowledged as much publicly in 2021. We fell back on the rest of the framework, which called for traditional inflation targeting.

Through the end of 2021, FOMC participants continued to forecast that inflation was likely to subside fairly quickly in 2022, with only a moderate increase in our policy rate. That projection was consistent with other central banks with different frameworks and the vast majority of forecasters. When the evidence showed otherwise, we hiked 525 basis points over a period of 16 months.

The most recent data suggest that 12-month PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation was 2.2 percent in April, far below its 7.2 percent peak in 2022. In a welcome and historically unusual result, this disinflation has come without the sharp increase in unemployment that has often accompanied a campaign of rate hikes to reduce inflation.

The economic environment has changed significantly since 2020, and our review will reflect our assessment of those changes. Longer-term interest rates are a good deal higher now, driven largely by real rates given the stability of longer-term inflation expectations. Many estimates of the longer-run level of the policy rate have risen, including those in the Summary of Economic Projections.

Higher real rates may also reflect the possibility that inflation could be more volatile going forward than in the inter-crisis period of the 2010s. We may be entering a period of more frequent, and potentially more persistent, supply shocks—a difficult challenge for the economy and central banks.

While our policy rate is currently well above the lower bound, in recent decades we have cut the rate by about 500 basis points when the economy is in recession. Although getting stuck at the lower bound is no longer the base case, it is only prudent that the framework continue to address that risk.

While the framework must evolve, some elements of it are timeless. Policymakers emerged from the Great Inflation with a clear understanding that it was essential to anchor inflation expectations at an appropriately low level. During the Great Moderation, well-anchored inflation expectations allowed us to provide policy support to employment without risking destabilizing inflation. Since the Great Inflation, the U.S. economy has had three of its four longest expansions on record. Anchored expectations played a key role in facilitating these expansions. More recently, without that anchor, it would not have been possible to achieve a roughly 5 percentage point disinflation without a spike in unemployment.

Keeping longer-run inflation expectations anchored was a driving force behind establishing the 2 percent target in the 2012 framework. Maintaining that anchor was a major consideration behind the changes in 2020. Anchored expectations are critical to everything we do, and we remain fully committed to the 2 percent target today.

2025 Review

In the current review, the Committee is engaged in discussions about what we have learned from the experience of the past five years. We plan to complete the consideration of specific changes to the consensus statement in the coming months. We are paying particular attention to the 2020 changes as we consider discrete but important updates reflecting what we have learned about the economy, and the way those changes were interpreted by the public. In our discussions so far, participants have indicated that they thought it would be appropriate to reconsider the language around shortfalls. And at our meeting last week, we had a similar take on average inflation targeting. We will ensure that our new consensus statement is robust to a wide range of economic environments and developments.

In addition to revising the consensus statement, we will also consider potential enhancements to our formal policy communications, particularly regarding the role of forecasts and uncertainty. As we have been reviewing assessments of the 2020 framework and of policy decisions in recent years, a common observation is the need for clear communications as complex events unfold. While academics and market participants generally have viewed the FOMC's communications as effective, there is always room for improvement. Indeed, clear communication is an issue even in relatively placid times. A critical question is how to foster a broader understanding of the uncertainty that the economy generally faces. In periods with larger, more frequent, or more disparate shocks, effective communication requires that we convey the uncertainty that surrounds our understanding of the economy and the outlook. We will examine ways to improve along that dimension as we move forward.

Let me end by saying thank you again for being here. We have been looking forward to the conversations that will occur over the next two days. These discussions will help broaden and deepen our thinking about these issues, and they are critical to the success of these reviews.”

The Fed conference is part of the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) 2025 review of its monetary policy framework, building on the legacy of Thomas Laubach’s contributions to monetary policy research. Introduced in 2012 as the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, it formalized the FOMC’s 2% inflation target and dual mandate (maximum employment and minimum 2% price stability). The framework must adapt to changing economic conditions, as historical challenges like the Great Depression, Great Inflation, and Great Moderation to COVID and now Trump policy uncertainty.

The post-2008 era featured low interest rates, low growth, low inflation, and a flat Phillips curve, with the policy rate near the effective lower bound (ELB) for seven years after the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. In the 2019-20 policy review, the Fed adopted a flexible average inflation targeting (FAIT) approach, aiming for inflation moderately above 2% after persistent shortfalls to anchor inflation expectations. Fed also shifted from “deviations” to “shortfalls” in assessing maximum employment, allowing exploration of low unemployment without assuming inflationary pressure unless evidence suggested otherwise. Fed addressed ELB risks, where low nominal rates could raise real rates in downturns, harming employment and inflation. The FAIT overshoot strategy became irrelevant due to high inflation post-2020, leading to a return to traditional inflation targeting.

Post-2020 (COVID) Economic Shifts

Inflation peaked at 7.2% in 2022 (PCE), far above the 2% target, prompting 525 basis points in rate hikes over 16 months. Fed made a great mistake by repeatedly terming COVID-related inflation shocks as transitory due to temporary higher demand (COVID-related fiscal stimulus, direct grants, easy loans and helicopter money). But the Fed ignored the COVID-related supply side shock followed by Trump trade war 1.0. Fed didn’t go for timely rate hikes and QE tapering to bring down demand and as a result, inflation soared. Fed then goes for blast-off and by April 2025, PCE inflation fell to 2.2%, with no significant unemployment spike—a rare outcome (soft landing) historically.

2025 Review Focus

·       Reassessing 2020 Changes

·       Reviewing the “shortfalls” language and FAIT approach, given their public interpretation and economic developments

·       Aiming for a framework robust to diverse economic scenarios

Enhancing Communications (forward language)

·       Improving clarity on forecasts, uncertainty, and risks, especially during complex or volatile periods

·       Addressing the challenge of conveying economic uncertainty to a broader audience

Key Takeaways

·       The FOMC is adapting its framework to a post-2020 world with higher real rates, potential inflation volatility, and reduced but persistent ELB risks.

·       The 2% inflation target and anchored expectations remain non-negotiable pillars.

·       The 2025 review will refine the 2020 framework, focusing on lessons learned and clearer communication of uncertainty.

Analysis

Fed Chair Powell indicated more clarity in the official Fed statement about Trump's policy uncertainty, which can cause a supply-side shock/inflation for the US economy. As a central bank, the Fed can only control/manage the demand side of the economy through various monetary policy tools like rate hikes, QE tapering/closing, QT etc. The government can manage supply-side shocks through various fiscal measures and policy tools. But as a central bank, the Fed may also manage demand to match the supply side equation through monetary policy tightening or loosening. On Thursday, Fed Chair Powell also indicated the Fed is open to cutting rates near zero (as during COVID-19 in 2020, GFC in 2008) under any potential Trumpcession scenario.

Conclusions

Fed is now waiting for early July and August (90-day windows) for a definitive clue about Trump tariffs trajectory, which would be a minimum of 10% on all countries with some sectoral 20%-25% (automobiles, metals, pharma). Trump may not afford to impose 20% tariffs on Chinese goods as it will be ultimately borne by Americans and may erode his vote bank, and also the net bank if US corporations are not allowed to increase their prices.

Trump may soon withdraw his 20% Fentanyl levy on China, and the US will continue 10% universal tariffs on all and sectoral higher tariffs of 20% -25% on metals, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals, along with selected exemptions. But even at around 15%-20% weighted average tariffs, it’s still substantially higher than the 2.5% prior, which will inevitably cause a higher cost of living for Americans, subdued discretionary consumer spending, tepid private capex, higher unemployment, and lower economic growth. In other words, the US economy may be heading for a stagflation-like scenario in the coming days unless there is a corresponding increase in real income along with productivity.

Bottom line

Fed may not cut in June’25 amid lingering Trump tariff talk uncertainty, but may act in September’25 and December’25 depending upon Trump’s implemented tariffs and overall US economic situation.

Market Impact

On Thursday, May 15, 2025, Wall Street and also Gold surged on hopes of Powell and Trump Put. Fed Chair Powell sounded less hawkish than earlier after the progress of the US-China trade deal and the pause of 145% Chinese tariffs for 90 days, which may ensure no supply-side shock for the US economy shortly. Trump may eventually extend his tariff war ceasefire deadline for all countries, including China, till at least December’2025 to ensure tariff policy certainty during the holiday/X-Mas shopping season.

On Thursday, Wall Street was also boosted by renewed hopes of a soft landing amid cooling inflation, soft US PPI data, and better-than-expected retail sales. Wall Street closed mixed in another day of consolidation as investors weighed earnings, economic data, and lingering trade talk uncertainty. The S&P 500 rose 0.4% for a fourth straight gain, lifted by Cisco on an upbeat AI-driven forecast, while the Dow added 271 points and the Nasdaq 100 finished muted, as Amazon and Meta weighed. UnitedHealth plunged following reports of a Federal criminal investigation, weighing on the health sector. Retail giant Walmart fell after warning it would raise prices due to tariffs, even as it reported better-than-expected sales. GE gained as Qatar pinned Boeing's largest wide-body aircraft order to be solely made with GE engines.

On Thursday, Wall Street was boosted by utilities, consumer staples, real estate, healthcare, materials, industrials, financials, and energy, while dragged by consumer discretionary, communication services, and techs. Dow Jones (DJ-30) was boosted by Cisco, Amgen, Coca-Cola, IBM, Travelers, Sherwin, P&G, Verizon, Honeywell, and McDonald’s, while dragged by UnitedHealth, Amazon, Walt Disney, Walmart, Apple, NVIDIA, and American Express.

Weekly-Technical trading levels: DJ-30, NQ-100, and Gold

Looking ahead, whatever the fundamental narrative, technically Dow Future (CMP: 41400) now has to sustain over 41800 for a further rally towards 42000/42500-43000/43200 and 43500, and even 44600-45200 in the coming days; otherwise sustaining below 41700, DJ-30 may again fall to 41000/40600-4010039900 and 39700/38600-38000/37700-37300/37000 in the coming days.

Similarly, NQ-100 Future (20200) has to sustain over 20800 for a further rally to 21100/21400-21700*/22000 and 22400-22600 in the coming days; otherwise, sustaining below 20750/20600-20500/20400, NQ-100 may again fall to 20000/19600-19400/19200 and 19100/18800-18600/18000-17600/16400 and 16200-15800 in the coming days.

Also, technically Gold (CMP: 3240) has to sustain over 3275-3300 for any recovery to 3325/3375* and 3400/3425-3450/3505*, and even 3525/3555 in the coming days; otherwise sustaining below 3290-3275, Gold may again fall to 3255/3225-3200/3165* and further to 3130/3115*-3075/3015-2990/2975-2960*/2900* and 2800/2750 in the coming days.